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A B S T R A C T   
Input subsidies are a popular redistributive policy measure in many developing countries to 
support climate change adaptation through yield stabilization and food security in a small-farm 
context. Nevertheless, the evidence of the effectiveness of the programs is mixed. One main 
point of critique is that these programs are vulnerable to political interference leading to misuse. 
In this paper we assess if targeted investments in public data and information infrastructure can 
reduce entry points for political interference. We present a case study on Guatemala in which 
fertilizer distribution was accompanied by an effort of open data provision and transparency 
under the Zero Hunger Pact. For this case study, we used a mixed-method approach. We show 
that political interference was a significant determinant of fertilizer distribution in the 2012–2015 
election period and to analyze the role that information and data played with this regard. The 
paper closes by proposing four action points that could help to harvest the potential of infor-
mation, data, and digital tools to reduce political interference into public redistributive decision- 
making.   
1. Introduction 
Direct input subsidy programs are an important tool in agricultural policy to support the resilience of the small-scale sector. 
Increasing smallholder resilience is crucial as extreme climatic events are on the rise, globally (Eckstein et al., 2020). These events 
affect livelihoods and food security of small-scale farmers and challenge the emergency response and risk management capacity of the 
public sector (FSIN, 2020). Well-designed subsidy programs can support ex-ante risk management or ex-post coping strategies of rural 
households and other actors in food systems in the face of extreme climatic events (Jayne et al., 2018). Agricultural input provision can 
support sustainable intensification or foster the use of other climate-smart agricultural technologies that can increase mitigation and 
adaptation capacity of smallholder farmers (ibid.). Direct agricultural subsidies hold the promise of being a useful tool to generate 
positive outcomes in agricultural production and food and nutrition security (Walls et al., 2018). Considering the urgency of improving 
public sector responses to climate extremes in countries of the global south, leveraging scarce public resources is the key. 
Nevertheless, empirical research shows that direct subsidies are often not allocated in an optimal way. Studies suggest that political 
interference can have a strong impact on the distribution of agricultural input subsidies, which leads to suboptimal allocation and 
deadweight loss (e.g. Banful, 2011; Jayne and Rashid, 2013; Mason et al., 2013; Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2012; systematic reviews: 
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Hemming et al., 2018; Jayne and Rashid, 2013). Political interference takes various forms: clientelism, elite capture and vote buying. 
For political elites, agricultural input subsidies are an attractive way to show their support for their electorate, because the benefits are 
clearly visible in terms of the physical inputs and their effect on crop production, especially compared to an universal subsidy program 
(Jayne and Rashid, 2013). Strong information asymmetries among low-income and income-insecure populations make farmers and 
farm families especially responsive to clientelistic distribution systems (Bobonis et al., 2017; Brusco et al., 2004; Banerjee et al., 2018; 
Casey, 2015). 
Open government data together with digital information technologies hold the potential to improve the delivery of public services 
and make direct subsidy programs more effective (OECD 2019; Kosec and Wantchekon, 2018; ODC, 2015; Ubaldi, 2013): better in-
formation and increased information availability can guide effective decision-making on distributional aspects and can increase the 
accountability of decision-makers for their decisions made and thus reduce incentives for interfering into distributional policy. But the 
provision of open data and information is not a panacea. The impact of information on government accountability and distributional 
decisions might be mediated by contextual and institutional aspects (Jelenic, 2019). Aspects such as the ability or the incentives to act 
upon information can have a significant impact on how information provision influences government accountability and thus unbiased 
service delivery (Kosec and Wantchekon, 2018). 
We examine how a governmental open data initiative has played out in Guatemala, a country in Central America with high levels of 
food insecurity. Guatemala is a country with a long tradition in public direct input subsidy distribution to the small-farming sector 
through a fertilizer subsidy program aimed at boosting small-farmer productivity and increasing food security (ASIES, 2012). In the 
last ten years, Guatemala is experiencing an increasing occurrence of extreme climatic events with strong negative effects on rural 
families and their food security (FSIN, 2020). During two consecutive years with extreme dry spells in 2014 and 2015, the fertilizer 
program was also part of a Government effort to reduce food insecurity and was meant to be directed to drought-affected, food insecure 
famers to support their recovery. 
The Guatemalan fertilizer program has been under harsh critique and accused of being politically instrumentalized by the gov-
ernment to buy votes and benefit supporters (ASIES 2012). Critics complained that despite the availability of information on 
drought-induced food insecurity in 2014 and 2015, the direct subsidy was not directed to those most affected. An analysis recon-
structed the impact of the program with household survey data and found that many beneficiaries were wealthier and hold larger 
landholdings than stated in the selection criteria (IARNA & FAUSAC, 2013). Also, the government was harshly criticized for its failure 
to set up a high-quality monitoring system (IARNA & FAUSAC, 2013), even though it did publish several types of relevant data. The 
evidence on political interference, however, is anecdotal and presented by NGOs and the press. 
Our study sheds a light on the role of information and information provision for distributional decisions in the direct input subsidy 
program in Guatemala. Firstly, we examine the claim of political interference through a quantitative study of the factors that influ-
enced distributional decisions in the fertilizer subsidy program during the period 2013–2015. Secondly, we used a qualitative 
approach to study which factors influenced information use for distributional decision-making, based on interactions with diverse 
actors in Guatemala. Based on this evidence, we discuss whether open government data and information have the potential to reduce 
political interference. 
The role of information, open (government) data and the digital transformation on decision-making processes is empirically not 
well established yet (Jelenic, 2019). We contribute to a further understanding of the potential of open data in government transparency 
in direct subsidy distribution through a mixed-method approach focused on a case study in Guatemala. Our quantitative approach to 
investigating the effect of political interference in input distribution can provide a more objective evidence and an assessment of its 
extent. Our qualitative analysis will give a deeper understanding of the potential of data, information and digital transformation for 
evidence-base decision-making in the Guatemalan context. 
2. Case study context 
Central American countries are frequently hit by extreme climatic events (Eckstein et al., 2018). They have high vulnerability and 
low adaptive capacity to climate change, especially in rural areas (Bouroncle, 2017). The occurrence of extended dry spells, one of the 
mayor threats for agricultural production and food security in the region, is expected to increase with increasing climate variability 
(Anderson et al., 2019). The public capacity to respond is limited, as public actors in Central American countries have long-standing 
institutional weaknesses and low fiscal capacity (Müller et al., 2019). 
In Central America, public redistributive efforts through direct input subsidies are a popular tool both for emergency response 
facing extreme climatic events and for long-term development of the agricultural sector. Among citizens these programs suffer from 
bad reputation as they are prone to be used for political interests. The redistributive system lacks transparency and it is difficult to hold 
politicians accountable for their redistributive decisions. The national fertilizer program in Guatemala started in the year 2000 to foster 
food security via yield increases among the most resource-poor farmers in the country, specifically targeting farmers with small farms 
(ASIES, 2012). Funded through the Ministry of Agriculture (MAGA in what follows, its Spanish acronym), different public organi-
zations were responsible to execute the program during its existence, with MAGA being the managing institution of the program. 
Between 2004 and 2012, the fertilizer program used between 9% and 50% of MAGA’s total budget, which indicates the importance of 
the program for agricultural redistributive agricultural policy. MAGA’s budget represents on average around 3% of the total gov-
ernment budget (IARNA & FAUSAC, 2013). 
The distribution method has been changing throughout the program period: in some years, the program directly distributed fer-
tilizer bags to farmers, in others the program distributed vouchers. In the beginning, the fertilizer was completely subsidized, in other 
years the inputs were only partly subsidized (IARNA & FAUSAC, 2013). Besides the fertilizer, other types of support were provided 
A. Müller et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Environmental Development 38 (2021) 100613
3
such as seeds, other inputs, and different combinations of these. 
Two previous studies confirmed the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of the program using household surveys (ASIES, 2012; IARNA 
& FAUSAC, 2013). The fertilizer program failed to establish concrete selection criteria for the beneficiaries, e.g. in terms of their farm 
size or yield. In our period of observation, selection criteria were very broad and did not specify any thresholds: being a maize and bean 
producer, being the household head of a family and engaging in subsistence production (Garoz and Slowing Umaña, 2014). These 
studies showed that most beneficiaries of the program were above the subsistence level (ASIES, 2012). Also, the program did not 
measurably increase productivity and had very high administrative and logistical costs. The ASIES (2012) study indicates that 
important political influence occurred in the allocation process. Political influence affected the compilation of beneficiary lists, which 
pass through several hands. Different actors at different political levels added names of beneficiaries to the lists, without clear selection 
or control mechanisms (ASIES, 2012). The report does not, however, show clear evidence of such political influence, a gap that our 
study addresses. 
During the government period 2012–2015, MAGA’s fertilizer program was part of a government effort to significantly reduce food 
insecurity through the Zero Hunger Pact (ASIES, 2012; Gobierno de Guatemala, 2012a). Food insecurity became a stronger criterion in 
the policy discussion around fertilizer distribution and thus the fertilizer program played an important role during the extreme dry 
years in 2014 and 2015 in the government efforts to reduce acute food insecurity in the affected areas. During the same time, the 
Guatemalan government implemented the “Open Government” agenda that included a push towards more transparency in public data 
and information (Gobierno de Guatemala, 2012b). The different public entities increasingly published data and information online. In 
this wave of openness, data reporting on fertilizer distribution were made available to the public as well as data on food security and 
poverty that went beyond the data normally collected through the census. This allowed us to get detailed data and information to 
understand in more detail government decision-making. 
After continued allegations of corruption and clientelism, the fertilizer program ended in 2015 and was substituted by a direct cash 
subsidy to poor farmers in 2016.1 MAGA is now distributing vouchers of 200 GTQ (around 27 USD), and farmers are now free to choose 
the input they need.2 Allegations of political interference continue until today. 
3. Materials and methods 
3.1. Data sources and panel data analysis 
We use data on fertilizer distribution for the time from 2012 through 2015 published by MAGA as part of its contribution to the Zero 
Hunger Pact. These data list the beneficiaries with their names, as well as the bags of fertilizers that were distributed in the 340 
municipalities of Guatemala. The data were collected by MAGA and were publicly available during this time on the official webpage of 
MAGA (https://www.maga.gob.gt/) under the Open Government strategy. The data were eventually removed, and the complete data 
are not findable anymore on MAGA’s current webpage. Part of the data are still available in raw format on archive.org.3 From these 
data, we extracted the number of beneficiaries in each municipality for each year. We then estimated the share of beneficiaries as the 
number of beneficiaries in each municipality with respect to the total population in the municipality, which is our response variable in 
the analysis. 
To examine the determinants of fertilizer distribution we included different control variables in the model. To see whether the 
distribution is biased we used the results of the presidential elections in 2011 to characterize political affiliation during the government 
period of 2012–2015. Specifically, we look at which party got the majority of votes in each municipality by using a dummy whether the 
mayor is from the ruling party. The mayor can be from a different political party than the presidential party. We calculated the vote 
share percentage of the ruling party in the respective municipality. We obtained election data from the official election report 2011 
(TSE, 2011) publicly available at the Guatemalan Supreme Election Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo Electoral). 
We included additional control variables that function as proxies for the official criteria used to include beneficiaries in the pro-
gram. The official criteria for beneficiary selection during the program existence were poverty, food (in-)security and small-scale 
subsistence production (ASIES, 2012). We included municipal level data on poverty and data on the rate of chronic and acute un-
dernutrition. As a proxy for the presence for small-scale production in the municipality we included the share of land dedicated to grain 
production. As small-scale farmers in Guatemala mostly produce maize and beans for subsistence, we assume a higher presence of 
small-scale farmers where there is a higher total area dedicated to this crop. This is an incomplete proxy, as this could also reflect 
increased presence of large-scale production. Thus, we also include the Gini coefficient for inequality in land distribution. We use the 
Gini coefficient as a proxy for the presence of small-scale production in the municipality. A higher Gini coefficient is an indicator of a 
larger share of land in fewer hands and a proxy for social inequalities and higher presence of resource-poor, small scale farmers in the 
municipality. The fertilizer program was supposed to target small-scale production. All the information is coming from official gov-
ernment sources.4 
1 http://www.prensalibre.com/guatemala/comunitario/no-entregaran-abono-sino-subsidio-de-q200.  
2 http://www.prensalibre.com/economia/maga-volvera-a-entregar-cupones-de-subvencion-por-q200-a-agricultores.  
3 https://web.archive.org/web/20160602093124/http://web.maga.gob.gt/avances-pacto-hambre-cero/.  
4 Data on poverty is retrieved from the National Statistics Bureau (INE); data on chronic and acute undernutrition is retrieved from the Secretariat 
for Food Security (SESAN) and the production data is estimated based on data from agricultural census 2003 from MAGA. Contact the authors for 
access to the data used in the study. 
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The spatial variation in the impact of drought or other climatic factors was an additional consideration of governments to take 
decisions on fertilizer distribution during our period of observation. As 2014 and 2015 were years that experienced an extreme climatic 
event in the form of an extended dry spell that significantly influenced agricultural production and food security. To reflect this in our 
model, we included the Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) as a proxy for drought impact. The NDVI uses remotely sensed 
data to estimate the greenness and vigor of vegetation. The NDVI is used as an index for drought-related stress in agriculture (WMO & 
GWP, 2016). We included, for each municipality, mean NDVI for June–September, for 2012 through 2015, as a proxy for the presence 
of an extended dry spell during the rainy season. The rainy season lasts from May to September, peaks in rainfall occur in June and 
September and the canícula normally occurs in July or early August. This canícula has the biggest effect on agricultural production and 
food security. Low NDVI values indicate dry vegetation on the ground. 
To perform the analysis, we had to merge data from different sources and deal with missing values in several of the control var-
iables. We could create a complete dataset only for 240 out of the 340 existing municipalities. The variables with the highest share of 
missing data were poverty (15.6%) and acute undernutrition (15–17% per year). We assumed that the data are missing at random, 
meaning that the probability that a value is missing does not depend on the values of the data (van Buuren, 2018). We used the R 
package MICE (Multiple Imputation by Chained Equations) to impute the missing data, using the predictive mean matching method 
(van Buuren, 2018). We did not impute categorical data. Through imputation, our sample increased to 328 municipalities. For the 
analysis of the data we use a random effects panel data model, analyzing data from 2012 to 2014. 
The year 2015 is different from the rest of the years in terms of missing data. It cannot be assumed that the data are missing at 
random. Therefore, we excluded this year from the econometric analysis. 
We used the data from 2012 through 2014 to perform a panel data analysis. After performing the Hausman test, we opted for a 
random effects panel data model. Most of the variables do not vary over the observation period. NDVI and acute undernutrition are the 
control variables that do vary over the observation period. 
3.2. Qualitative data analysis 
We supplemented the deductive, quantitative analysis on fertilizer distribution with a qualitative and ethnographic approach to 
explore the role of information and data for distributional decision-making in a more nuanced and contextualized fashion. Comple-
mentary data and information were gathered since 2014 through our involvement in a research project financed by the CGIAR 
Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS) and the Interamerican Institute for Global Change 
Research. The research was not necessarily directed at answering the research questions of the present manuscript, but they touched 
upon the topic in different ways (e.g. the topic of fertilizer distribution came up in semi-structured interviews or we could observe how 
information was generated and used for decision-making for other distributional decisions). We feed our qualitative analysis from 
different sources applying a combination of methods. 
We were participants of a community of stakeholders from research, the public and the humanitarian sector working in the area of 
improving information and data management for decision-making in the area of climate risk management and food security in 
Guatemala during various years. Being participants as observers allowed us to get nuanced and context-specific qualitative information 
through participation in meetings, conferences, roundtables, and personal interaction. We base our analysis on personal notes, pro-
tocols, and reports. In the course of different studies, we applied semi-structured expert interviews, focus group discussions and 
literature and content analysis, (for a detailed explanation of the different unstructured and semi-structured datasets and the approach 
to analysis please refer to Müller at al. 2019a, 2019b; Müller et al., 2020, Bouroncle et al., 2019). As a user of public government data 
ourselves for the present study we could gain valuable additional insights in how data and information may be used for 
decision-making. For this research article, we analyzed the data using content analysis and classification methods. 
4. Results 
4.1. Factors that influenced fertilizer distribution 
First, we visualize our available data of distributed fertilizer for 2012 to 2015 by mapping the share of beneficiaries for each 
municipality. We see a similar pattern of missing data throughout 2012–2014. Data availability for 2015 is obviously systematically 
different than the years before. We assume that the data are not missing at random, meaning that there is a relationship between the 
propensity of being missing and the value of the variable (van Buuren, 2018). 
The pattern of the missing data for 2015 in Fig. 1 coincides with the so-called Guatemalan dry corridor. In 2014 and 2015, 
Guatemala suffered an extended dry spell that severely affected agricultural production and food security (Müller et al., 2019). The 
year 2015 was an election year. The then-president was convicted due to corruption and fraud and the chronically underfunded public 
sector was not able to respond to the food security crisis (ibid.). 
To estimate the determinants of fertilizer distribution in Guatemala we used a random effects panel data model. We estimated two 
models. Model 1 included a dummy whether the mayor is from the ruling party and Model 2 included the vote share percentage of the 
ruling party. Both variables were used in the model to proxy political influence on fertilizer distribution. Whether the mayor is from the 
ruling party in the municipality may influence the amount allocated to the municipality. But the vote share percentage of the ruling 
party in the municipality may further influence the distributional pattern: politicians may use fertilizer as a reward for their supporters 
(core-supporter model, Cox and McCubbins, 1986), or they may use fertilizer to gain support from those who voted for another party 
(swing-voter model, Cox, 2010). 
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Both variables that represent political influence have a significant and positive effect on the share of beneficiaries in Guatemalan 
municipalities (see Table 1). On average, the share of beneficiaries was 2.7% higher in municipalities where the ruling party won the 
last elections in 2014. There is even a larger effect when we look at the vote share percentage of the ruling party: for a 1% of increase in 
the vote share, the share of the fertilizer program beneficiaries increases on average by 11.8%. This does support the “core-supporter 
model” of Cox and McCubbins (1986) stating that governments target with their redistributive politics areas where it received strong 
electoral support. Informally, the program was also famous for being used by local politicians to reward their followers. Our analysis 
confirms that the distributional decisions for the fertilizer subsidy were significantly biased through political interest. Nevertheless, 
other factors that represent official selection criteria also influenced the distribution. 
In terms of climatic aspects, we see that the impact of drought (proxied through the NDVI) indeed seems to have influenced the 
distribution – all else being equal. The lower the mean NDVI, the higher the share of beneficiaries in the municipality. Based on the 
public perception of the fertilizer distribution during this period we would have expected the NDVI not to be significant. 
In terms of how other official selection criteria influenced distribution decisions we see the following pattern. The level of poverty 
in the municipality has a significant and positive effect. Area dedicated to maize and bean production and the Gini coefficient of land 
distribution have both a negative effect on the share of beneficiaries. This means that the larger the area dedicated to maize and bean 
production, the lower the share of beneficiaries in this municipality. The negative effect of the Gini coefficient means that, all else 
being equal, the higher the inequality, the lower the share of beneficiaries. IARNA & FAUSAC (2013) found in their evaluation of the 
Guatemalan fertilizer program that the subsidy does not meet the criteria of preferring small-scale, resource-poor beneficiaries. Our 
analysis reveals a similar pattern. 
Both, the prevalence of chronic and acute undernutrition in a municipality are not significant for fertilizer distribution in our 
model, which is surprising as the program has an explicit focus on assuring the food security of rural families. 
Climate, poverty, and the presence of small-scale production did indeed play a role in the distribution of fertilizer in Guatemalan 
municipalities, reflecting (partly) the objectives of the program. Food security considerations and the presence of small-scale pro-
duction did not play a significant role or even had a negative effect. We show that political considerations influenced fertilizer dis-
tribution with those municipalities where the ruling party had a greater vote share margin benefitting on average more from the 
subsidy than others. This means probably political interests bias or mediate to a certain degree the influence of information on the 
“hard” selection criteria for beneficiaries. 
Fig. 1. Share of fertilizer beneficiaries per municipality from 2012 to 2015.  
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4.2. Role of data and information in input distribution decisions 
In the previous section we have shown that, in the face of increasing climate risks and extreme, information on the impact of those 
seems to be mediated in its effect on distributional outcomes through political interests. In this section we will reflect on why those 
areas most affected by drought and climatic events (proxied by the NDVI) were not necessarily more likely to receive a direct input 
subsidy. 
One of the main entry points for political interference in the fertilizer distribution is the compilation of beneficiary lists in each 
municipality. The process is highly politicized and untransparent, with different political actors involved in the process at different 
administrative levels (ASIES, 2012). On one occasion, we observed in the field how information on the impact of drought on maize and 
bean production was gathered (see detailed information in Müller et al., 2019). No specific selection criteria for beneficiaries of public 
subsidies were in place. This reflects what has been found for the fertilizer program: broad selection criteria were defined, but there 
was no evidence on how these criteria were operationalized to guide the definition of beneficiaries (ASIES, 2012). In the case of 
drought damage and loss, official data were requested to define beneficiaries of government support, but there was no guideline on 
how to generate this data. So, extension agents or extension units were developing their own data collection and analysis method 
(Müller et al., 2019). The commonly used paper-based data collection schemes by the extension system leave room for influence on the 
collected field data. Superiors check and enter the data into databases that are then used to support the definition of beneficiaries. On 
one occasion we could observe during a field activity how a supervisor corrected data about damage and loss in maize production 
collected by an extension agent, based on his own opinion without having been to the field in our model. This gives an idea on possible 
entry points for interference into the generation of data for distributional decision-making. Data collected through the extension 
system is prone to manipulation. 
This contrasts with data collected by the official statistical sources in Guatemala, generated by the National Statistics Institute (INE) 
that have clear guidelines for the data generation process that aim at reducing bias.5 For example, over the years, sampling frames for 
surveys have been improved. 
The large gap for available data on fertilizer distribution in 2015 requires further attention, however. Sources in the extension 
system told us that the fertilizer was distributed in all municipalities. But the data were not officially published for those municipalities 
most affected by drought in 2015. The obvious non-randomness of municipalities that have no data for 2015 and the selective 
Table 1 
Random effects model of determinants of fertilizer distribution.   
Dependent variable: 
Percentage of Beneficiaries in Municipality 
(1) (2) 
Mayor is from ruling party (dummy) 0.027*** 
(0.010)  
Vote share percentage from ruling party  0.118*** 
(0.041) 




















Acute undernutrition 0.00001 0.00002 
(0.00004) (0.00004) 





Observations 984 1020 
R2 0.155 0.155 
Adjusted R2 0.151 0.151 
F Statistic 6.264*** 
(df = 28; 955) 
6.515*** 
(df = 28; 991) 
Note: *p < 0.5; **p < 0.1; ***p < 0.01. 
5 In other contexts, however, the discrepancy between official statistics and data collected through independent surveys can be an issue of concern 
when it comes to evidence-based decision-making. Sandefur and Glassman (2014) show for different African countries that data collected through 
household surveys may paint a different picture from the one provided by official statistics. In this case, the discrepancies arose through perverse 
incentives to bias data to financial rewards or donor funding policies. 
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transparency in data publication leave space for speculation. Many consulted stakeholders suspected that political interest was guiding 
the non-publication of the data. An important part of the context was that 2015 was an election year, that the president stepped down 
due to a corruption scandal, and that the government had very limited financial possibilities to respond to the drought. This specific 
year, different datasets hinting at the critical situation in agricultural production and food security were withheld by the government. 
The suspicion is that the government did not want their low response capacity to the crisis to reflect negatively on the ruling party 
during the election period. The paucity of data made it more difficult to hold politicians and governments accountable for their 
inaction. 
4.3. Hurdles to data and information use in decision-making 
Official government data are an important resource to monitor the execution and impact of redistributive policies and hold pol-
iticians accountable (Ubaldi, 2013). But making data and information available do not automatically lead to higher government 
accountability and more beneficial distributive outcomes. Different contextual aspects and data characteristics influence how they 
might be considered in decision-making processes (Jelenic, 2019). Based on our research experience in Guatemala, we could identify 
several hurdles for the use of data and information in policy decisions around distributional aspects. We consider these aspects relevant 
to first have a better understanding of distributional decision-making processes and second to identify entry points to reduce bias and 
increase evidence-based decision-making. 
Our examples above clearly show that data accessibility, skills and incentives as important factors for data and information 
informing evidence-based decision-making processes. 
Access and accessibility. During our research project we experienced that it is difficult to find public and access public (or supposedly 
publicly available) information. This obstacle was also mentioned by some of the interviewees and project and research partners. 
Webpages are unorganized and often outdated. Without previous knowledge it is often difficult to know where to look for the data and 
information in need. Access to public and open information is often not guaranteed. Often, it is not clear how to get access to public 
data. For our study we tried on different occasions to get data through indicated contact emails at the respective public institution (e.g. 
Statistical Bureau INE), but we never were successful in getting a reply via email. The easiest way to access public data is often through 
personal contacts in the public administration. 
Capacities and skills. Use of public information is not straightforward and may require special skills and software. For our study, we 
needed a significant amount of time for data curation and specific software skills to prepare data from different government sources for 
the analysis. The available data are difficult to match due to different administrative codes and names, differing metrics in the variables 
and a lack of explanation (metadata) of the data. The data are often not presented in a machine-readable format. For example, the 
election results from 2011 were only available as a PDF report with several hundred pages where we had to extract the result tables and 
convert them to processable files relying on specialized programming skills. The available data often mismatch user needs in terms of 
scale, quality, or trustworthiness (see also Müller et al., 2020). 
Incentives. The institutional environment does not provide systematic incentives to use information in political decision-making in 
the area of climate risk management (see Müller et al., 2020). Hierarchical and centralized decision-making structures, a focus on 
complying bureaucratic obligations (e.g. “assemble a list”) rather than a focus on impact (e.g. “who needs it most”), budgetary 
constraints and constant political change create an institutional environment that provides little incentives to make evidence-driven 
policy decisions. 
5. Discussion and implications 
In the period from 2012 to 2015, the Guatemalan government has started to make important steps towards increasing transparency 
and accountability through an open government strategy. Certain – but not all – government data and information were made 
available. In the politicized and highly criticized fertilizer program, MAGA did refuse to publish full data on fertilizer distribution in an 
extremely political year that coincided with the presence of drought and high levels of food insecurity. This can be understood as an 
intent to evade accountability. The Guatemalan civil society had a strong suspicion towards the misuse of the program but could not 
make use of the existing data to prove the allegations (ASIES, 2012). 
Our quantitative analysis provides evidence that political interests influenced the decisions on fertilizer distribution in Guatemala. 
On top of this, it seems that food insecurity was not a significant criterion for fertilizer distribution, contrary to the targets of the 
program under the Zero Hunger Pact. Thus, the program also failed in supporting recovery from extreme drought and food insecurity 
during the time of the study. The Guatemalan civil society has criticized the program for a long time for its vulnerability to political 
influence. Our study is the first systematic confirmation of these allegations. Data publication made it possible to trace political in-
fluence and produce quantitative evidence about its extent. 
At the same time, our analysis shows that opening government data does not automatically lead to better and favorable distri-
butional outcomes. The open data promise did make some of the actions of the government more transparent. But to fully realize the 
effect of open data on decision-making and accountability, Guatemalan scientists, journalists, and civil society would need better 
access to data and information and would need stronger data use skills. It can be expected that open government data would also create 
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incentives for politicians and public decision-makers to engage in more evidence-based decision-making. Recent governments have 
repeated their commitment to open government data in the period following the study (from 2016 onwards). In spite of this, the 
response to COVID-19 (2020) has attracted similar critique and remains little transparent.6 
As a way forward we propose that targeted investments in open data governance and information infrastructure building can 
reduce the vulnerability of public redistributive systems to political interference and have the potential to support the effectiveness and 
efficiency of public redistributive programs as a tool for climate risk management. We propose three areas of action that support this 
aim. These three areas of action fall under the general guidelines of the framework for Open Government Data (Ubaldi, 2013).  
1) Increase access and reduce interference through digital tools and integrated information systems 
Clientelism is relatively high in contexts where little information is available and poverty is high and technological development is 
low (Hicken, 2011). Thus, access and accessibility of data is a key aspect. The inclusive use of digital technologies holds the potential to 
reduce political interference (Robinson and Verdier, 2013). Public information systems and open data platforms make information 
sources more broadly available and accessible Digital data collection and processing tools and integrated information systems can 
support the reduction of entry points for political interference. During the design process of digital tools and information systems, 
reduction of entry points and (dis-)incentives for interference can be an explicit design criterion. For example, the logfiles of digital 
tools report any manipulation of the data, allowing to track any misrepresentation or manipulation in the data.  
2) Usability, relevance and capacity building 
Data can effectively guide decision-making by policymakers. Viceversa, policy makers can use data to legitimize their decisions. 
Thirdly, data can be used to hold policy-makers accountable for their decisions (Jelenic, 2019). When civil society holds policy-makers 
accountable for their budgeting and distributional policy decisions, the latter can experience a strong incentive to reduce their personal 
interference in policy implementation (Ubaldi, 2013). For all this to happen, however, relevant data should be readily available in a 
usable format. 
A general user focus on decision-makers and users’ needs, user context and data use skills helps to create relevant information and 
useful information systems (Principles for Digital Development Forum, 2019). To achieve this, governmental policies and donor 
support should aim at the following goals.  
a. Government policy should assure access (if possible unrestricted) to data and information through a user-friendly website design 
and updated information on where to get offline data resources;  
b. The government should ensure streamlining and harmonizing data formats and codes in official data, and publish metadata, with a 
focus on interoperability of data. Data curation or the ability to link datasets from different sources is important for generating 
information for policy design, implementation and monitoring (OECD, 2019);  
c. The government should generate spatially disaggregated data to improve spatial targeting of policy-decision, allowing policy- 
makers to understand e.g. how climatic events differ across locations, farming systems and socio-economic context and thus 
improve targeting of input subsidy programs (OECD, 2019).  
d. And lastly, Policy makers, journalists and civil society representatives should build up the capacity and skills to process and 
interpret data to inform societal debate.  
3) Institutionalization of data innovations 
Governments increasingly acknowledge the importance of open data governance and digital transformation (OECD, 2019b), but 
this does not necessarily translate into sustainable change. 
In order to promote data- and evidence-driven public policy and decision-making, governments must be assisted in building not 
only public data systems, but also in focusing on the institutional context and incentives that frame decision-making and behavior 
(Sandefur and Glassman, 2014). As outlined above, multiple factors and their complex interplay favor clientelism and subjective 
interference into policy decisions. To make technological innovations work for decision-making in a public organizational, we cannot 
ignore aspects as decision-making cycles, hierarchies and power structures, dynamics of organizational learning and change, formal 
and informal rules, among others (OECD, 2019b). More concrete, this implies for example the alignment of the design of digital in-
formation systems with institutional decision-making protocols to assure people receiving the information are able to act upon the 
information. In another case studies in Guatemala we show that the unsystematic use of information and data for decision-making 
among public sector agents is the missing power to act upon the information – due to budgetary or hierarchical constraints in the 
regulatory framework (Müller et al., 2019). 
National statistic bureaus and other official branches related to data governance play a core role regarding the creation of an open 
and independent data ecosystem that provides data for meaningful and evidence-based decision-making (OECD, 2017). This means in 
the case of Guatemala the way towards a data governance scheme that guides data standardization, digitalization, and institutional 
change through a clear regulatory framework. The national statistics bureau (INE) and other data generating institutions need stable 
6 https://www.prensalibre.com/guatemala/justicia/fiscalia-contra-la-corrupcion-investiga-anomalias-en-entrega-de-alimentos-por-el- 
coronavirus/. 
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funding mechanisms that allow them to be more independent in their work. For a country as Guatemala this represents the big 
challenge and requires support from civil society, NGOs and the international donor community. 
The proposed action points depend on the will of the government and public institutions to embrace the change towards increased 
accountability. This change is not an easy endeavor. In Guatemala, there is a lot of friction between the mandate to open data and 
information systems and the fear of government officials to be held accountable for actions. But institutions in Guatemala are feeling 
pressure from different angles to increase transparency and accountability: civil society, donors and some legislators (deputies) are 
increasingly demanding to see the data that supports government decision-making. This is an important driving factor towards 
accountability and evidence-based policy. 
Follow-up research should address the limitations of this initial study. We used a mixed method approach to understand political 
interference into distributional decision-making and to reflect on the possible role that information, open government data and digital 
tools can play to support the transition towards government accountability and evidence-based policies. Our study is limited to discuss 
conceptual ideas on how information, open government data and digital infrastructure could support public distribution programs for 
climate change adaptation and mitigation. In the face of ever increasing availability of data, information and a push especially from 
donors towards governments from the global South to open up data and introduce digital tools for decision-making, it is urgent to reach 
a sound understanding whether this is leading to positive outcomes in distributional policies in times of climate change. A more 
systematic approach would be needed to reach a sound empirical understanding under which conditions information and open 
government data can support evidence-based decision-making to reach more favorable distributional outcomes. 
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